Is everyone overreacting to Russia’s “new spring offensive” in Ukraine? – Euromaidan Press

Is Russia gearing up for a new all-out offensive in Ukraine? Volodymyr Zelenskyy seems to think so — he issued a warning in March. Just days ago, Ukraine’s top general, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said the quiet part out loud: the offensive isn’t coming — it’s already underway.

A recent CNN report outlines the case. Russian forces are ramping up attacks along the front, especially around Pokrovsk, Lyman, and Zaporizhzhia. They’re also pressing toward Dnipropetrovsk — a region untouched since the early weeks of the war — with just six kilometers (4 miles) standing between them and a symbolic incursion. In the far north, Russian troops are edging into Sumy Oblast, forming “grey zones” where neither side has full control.

CNN’s analysis — based on satellite imagery, soldier accounts, and social media — points to a familiar pattern: Russia is quietly moving men and armor into position, even as spring mud slows the pace. They’re building toward something bigger — but whether it’s a breakthrough or more of the same is still unclear.

Still, despite the alarming reports, serious doubts remain as to whether this qualifies as a large-scale offensive — and how dangerous it really is.

Dnipro and Pokrovsk

Russia’s supposed advance toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast is directly tied to its Pokrovsk offensive. The connection is geographical—Pokrovsk sits near the Dnipropetrovsk border, and Russian forces have made notable gains to the west and southwest of the city, bringing them dangerously close to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. But Ukrainian defense expert Kyrylo Sazonov presents a starkly different picture than CNN’s reporting.

“In some places, they’re not even six kilometers away—more like four,” Sazonov acknowledges. But his account quickly contradicts the alarming narrative: “They entered the village of Kotlyne [near Pokrovsk]. But things quickly went sideways. Ukraine’s 25th Airborne Brigade absolutely crushed them there.”

Far from losing ground, Sazonov claims Ukrainian forces have made gains. The 25th Brigade recaptured several positions, while the 110th Mechanized Brigade halted Russian assaults near Pokrovsk and pushed them back. Ukrainian forces reportedly repelled attacks across six locations in a single week and advanced their positions. Russian military bloggers were “howling about a terrifying Ukrainian counteroffensive” three weeks ago, with the situation remaining largely unchanged since.

This contradicts CNN’s assessment. Sazonov questions how Russian troops recently “completely hammered” near Pokrovsk could suddenly pivot toward Dnipropetrovsk, mockingly asking, “They failed to capture Donetsk Oblast, the Pokrovsk assault collapsed — but somehow, crossing a few kilometers into Dnipropetrovsk is supposed to make Kyiv surrender?”

He dismisses the possibility of a serious Dnipropetrovsk invasion for two reasons: Russia’s true priority remains encircling Pokrovsk—an effort “stalled for nearly a month”—and capturing small portions of Dnipropetrovsk would provide “zero leverage in negotiations.”

“To us, it’s no different than any other region—Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, it’s all Ukraine,” Sazonov concludes. “They can only bomb Dnipro City with missiles and drones—they can’t march on it.”

Sumy and Kharkiv

Sumy Oblast borders Russia’s Kursk Oblast, so it might seem logical that Russian forces would try to push across the border while Ukrainian troops hold back behind fortified lines. But the reality is more complicated — and far less dramatic than some commentary suggests.

“There’s no reason for panic over Sumy,” wrote Maksym Zhorin, deputy commander of Ukraine’s 3rd Assault Brigade. “Enemy sabotage groups and border attacks have been happening there constantly. The region is shelled regularly — that’s nothing new.”

Zhorin emphasizes that the situation hasn’t fundamentally changed: “The enemy hasn’t made any real gains in this direction. Our forces have long since learned how to counter them under these conditions.”

What has changed, he says, is Russia’s broader strategy, “They’re trying to stretch the frontline—redirecting forces, opening up new zones of contact.”

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) supports this assessment. Their recent report states: “Russian forces continue making minor advances along the Sumy–Kursk border, but the units in this area are unlikely to launch a major offensive on Sumy without substantial reinforcements.”

Russia appears to be attempting to create a buffer zone along the Sumy border. In response, Ukrainian forces maintain a bridgehead inside Russia’s Kursk Oblast and have recently launched operations near the junction of Belgorod and Kursk oblasts. According to BBC Ukraine, Ukrainian troops established a foothold near the villages of Demydivka and Popivka.

Meanwhile, Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, continues to endure missile and drone attacks in what amounts to a four-year terror campaign. Despite apparent Kremlin interest in the city, there’s currently no immediate threat to Kharkiv itself.

A Ukrainian military source told BBC Ukraine that Russian forces are increasing activity near Vovchansk and have gained ground on several bridgeheads along the Oskil River. If Russian troops connect these positions and move armored units across, it could create defensive challenges near Kupiansk and along the Kharkiv-Belgorod border. But as of now, that scenario remains hypothetical.

Lyman and Zaporizhzhia

In early April, Russian forces punched through Ukrainian defenses on the Lyman axis, a source in Ukraine’s General Staff told BBC Ukraine.

The Lyman axis refers to a stretch of the front line where Russia is attacking from occupied Luhansk Oblast toward the strategic town of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast. Capturing Lyman would open a direct path to two of Ukraine’s key strongholds in Donetsk: Sloviansk and Kramatorsk — both critical for defending the remaining free territory in the region.

Russian troops had already established a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Zherebets River in late 2024. Now, they’ve expanded that foothold, advancing south toward Lyman and west toward the Oskil River and Borova in Kharkiv Oblast.

“If Russian forces reach these objectives, Ukraine’s defense will be in a difficult position,” BBC Ukraine reports, as it would sever logistics routes to the Serebryanskyi Forest, Siversk, and Sloviansk frontlines.

Further south, in Zaporizhzhia, Russian operations focus on tactical objectives rather than strategic ones.

Russian forces are trying to cut Ukrainian supply lines connected to the Donetsk–Zaporizhzhia highway. The villages of Bahatyr and Komar are under pressure; if they fall, Ukrainian troops may need to retreat up to 20 km (12 miles) westward, toward Dnipropetrovsk’s borders.

Russian attacks have also intensified south of Zaporizhzhia City, though a Ukrainian military source told BBC that this activity does not currently threaten the regional capital.

Russia’s resources are running thin

The Telegraph describes the widely discussed Russian “advance” as Vladimir Putin’s attempt to seize more territory before negotiating a ceasefire — an effort that is likely doomed to fail.

Analysts interviewed by the outlet point to severe shortages in Russian military equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery, which make it increasingly difficult for Moscow to exploit even small battlefield gains. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s effective use of drones continues to disrupt Russian troop movements and limit their ability to mass forces near the front.

“For now, any offensive by Russia on the frontline is impossible,” says Dmytro Zhmailo, Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre executive director. “Russia has no big military victories, but wants to create the illusion of large advances. We don’t see this on the ground.”

Ukrainian defense analyst Kostiantyn Mashovets notes that Russia has deployed approximately 62,000–65,000 troops near the Kursk–Sumy border, where Ukraine still controls a small section of territory. However, he believes this force could only support a limited operation in Sumy Oblast — no more than 10 kilometers (6 miles) deep and 30 kilometers (18 miles) wide — to establish a buffer zone. He stresses that a full-scale advance toward Sumy City would require “massive reinforcements.”

“Such reserves won’t be available to Russia until at least mid-summer,” Mashovets adds, “and only if mobilization goes smoothly and offensive activity on other fronts remains minimal.”

The more fundamental problem is equipment. According to Telegraph-cited estimates, Russia has lost around 3,000 tanks, 9,000 armored vehicles, and at least 13,000 artillery systems in the past year alone.

“The stocks are getting pretty low,” says John Hardie, deputy director of the Russia Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “By the end of this year, they’ll be really struggling to pull more—if not completely exhausted.”

Although Russia continues to outnumber Ukraine in raw manpower — with 160,000 new conscripts recently called up — the quality of these troops is limited. Training, experts say, often lasts just weeks or even days.

“That’s a conscious choice,” Hardie explains, “to keep pressure on Ukraine by throwing these troops into the meat grinder, rather than investing in rebuilding force quality while the war continues.”

Ukraine has countered by preventing Russian troops from amassing at any single point and expanding its drone operations along the front.

“Ukraine has leaned heavily on drones and unmanned systems to make up for shortfalls elsewhere,” notes Hardie. “They’ve adapted well to how Russia is fighting.”

The results are visible on the battlefield. According to British intelligence, Russian forces seized just 143 km² (55 square miles) of Ukrainian territory in March 2025 — a steep decline from over 700 km² (270 square miles) in November 2024. With daily gains now averaging less than 5 km² (2 square miles), Russia’s offensive momentum appears to be steadily eroding.